The vector product method developed in previous articles for space rotations and Lorentz transformations is extended to the cases of four-vectors, anti-symmetric tensors, and their transformations in Minkowski space. The electromagnetic fields are expressed in “six-vector” form using the notationH +iE, and this vector form is shown to be relativistically invariant. The wave equations of electromagnetism are derived using these vector products. The following three equations are deduced, which summarize electrodynamics in a compact form: (1) Maxwell's four equations expressed as (...) one, (2) the scalar and vector potential wave equations combined into one relation, and (3) the wave equations for the electric and magnetic fields and the continuity equation combined together. Space inversion, time reversal, and magnetic monopoles are also treated. (shrink)

This article presents a Pauli-Dirac matrix approach to Clifford Algebras. It is shown that the algebra C2 is generated by two Pauli matrices iσ2 and iσ3; C3 is generated by the three Pauli matrices σ1, σ2, σ3; C4 is generated by four Dirac matrices γ0, γ1, γ2, γ3 and C5 is generated by five Dirac matrices iγ0, iγ1, iγ2, iγ3, iγ5. The higher dimensional anticommuting matrices which generate arbitrarily high order Clifford algebras are given in closed form. The results obtained (...) with this Clifford algebra approach are compared with the vector product method which was described in a recent article [Found. Phys. 10, 531–553 (1980) by Poole, Farach and Aharonov] and with the Dirac, Rashevskii and Ramakrishnan methods of matrix generation. (shrink)

La filosofa de la liberacin latinoamericana es expresin de la realidad social e histrica de Latinoamrica. Los contrastes y la desigualdad se expresan en su discurso, tanto como en el historicismo, la sociologa y la teologa latinoamericanas.

O objetivo desta reflexão é estabelecer um diálogo entre os espaços da educação, filosofia e política, buscando construir pontes entre eles. Seu embasamento teórico se refere à crítica ao capitalismo e ao conceito de reificação, a partir de autores da Escola de Frankfurt, de Foucault e de Benjamin. Um episódio ocorrido em 29 de abril de 2015 foi escolhido para análise por representar um evento paradoxal nos campos e conceitos apontados. Concluímos que é necessário se repensar novas ações entre as (...) práticas educativas, as ações políticas e os saberes filosóficos, nos quais seus sujeitos sociais tenham disponibilidade ao diálogo, ao respeito e à democracia. (shrink)

La intensión del presente trabajo es la de explorar la relación medios-fines exponiendo que la misma se presenta en la obra de John Dewey como camino y horizonte coherente y consistente de su propuesta filosófica y educativa. La relación medios-fines dirige la investigación llevándonos a una comprensión del conocimiento como practica evaluativa y transformadora. Esta concepción epistemológica sienta las bases para repensar la educación y la democracia y brinda elementos suficientes para superar las dicotomías pensamiento - emoción, hechos - valores (...) y sociedad-individuo. El método utilizado es la investigación. La educación y la democracia son los espacios en los cuales la relación medios-fines, ya sea en su fase natural o adaptativa, ya sea en su fase moral o critica, ya sea en su fase social o publica, encuentra unidad y continuidad. En la educación de, por y para la democracia la inteligencia y la actividad se interrelacionan mutuamente. (shrink)

Longtime Radical legislator and former president of Aerolíneas Argentinas decries the corruption that results from the proliferation of pressure groups, all of whom are trying to influence a powerful interventionist State"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 57.

Even though management scholars have offered several views on the process of corporate sustainability, these efforts have focused mainly on the technical aspects of sustainability while omitting the fundamental role played by individual moral competences. Therefore, previous work offers an incomplete and somewhat reductionist view of corporate sustainability. In this article, we develop a holistic framework of corporate sustainability in which both the moral and technical aspects of sustainability are considered. We do so by integrating the ethical, normative perspective of (...) the Catholic social teaching with the competitive view of the natural resource-based view. This framework highlights the importance of CST principles and ideas in developing executive moral competences such as moral sensitivity and awareness, and moral cognition and motivation. Moral competences, in turn, influence the organizational selection of environmental strategies, giving leaders the intrinsic motivation to promote both a longer-term stance on corporate sustainability efforts and a relentless search for greener business models. Such strategies move the firm closer towards achieving environmental sustainability. Hence, by bridging the individual, normative-ethical with the organizational, implementational levels of corporate sustainability, our framework provides a more realistic, coherent, and complete perspective on the complex process of achieving corporate sustainability. (shrink)

No caminho dos trabalhos que versam sobre as questões envolvendo a autonomia da arte, categoria da Estética desde a modernidade, este artigo visa desenvolver explanações sobre dois autores, Arthur Schopenhauer e Herbert Marcuse que, devedores da estética kantiana, possuem perspectivas que permitem reflexões sobre a autonomia da arte, ainda que Marcuse se posicione como um crítico da perspectiva representada por Schopenhauer. Designadamente, este artigo apresentará a compreensão estética do filósofo Arthur Schopenhauer - na obra principal deste autor, O Mundo Como (...) Vontade e Representação – sobretudo o lugar do gênio artístico na obra do filósofo alemão, bem como apresentará os apontamentos do filósofo Herbert Marcuse na obra Dimensão Estética, de 1977, que sintetiza as principais questões da estética do autor. Palavras-chave: Schopenhauer, Marcuse, autonomia da arte, estética. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a much-discussed subject in the business world. The Internet has become one of the main tools for CSR information disclosure, allowing companies to publicise more information less expensively and faster than ever before. As a result, corporations are increasingly concerned with communicating ethically and responsibly to the diversity of stakeholders through the web. This paper addresses the main question as whether CSR information disclosure on corporate websites is influenced by country of origin and/or industry (...) sector. Analysing the websites of 127 corporations from emerging countries, such as Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand and South Africa, it becomes evident that both country of origin and industry sector have a significant influence over CSR information disclosure on the web (CSRIDOW). Based on the data studied, country of origin has a stronger influence over CSRIDOW than industry sector. (shrink)

The didactics of astronomy is a relatively young field with respect to that of other sciences. Historical issues have most often been part of the teaching of astronomy, although that often does not stem from a specific didactics. The teaching of astronomy is often subsumed under that of physics. One can easily consider that, from an educational standpoint, astronomy requires the same mathematical or physical strategies. This approach may be adequate in many cases but cannot stand as a general principle (...) for the teaching of astronomy. This chapter offers in a first part a brief overview of the status of astronomy education research and of the role of the history and philosophy of science (HPS) in astronomy education. In a second part, it attempts to illustrate possible ways to structure the teaching of astronomy around its historical development so as to pursue a quality education and contextualized learning. (shrink)

Raz holds that necessarily all legal authorities, even de facto authorities, make a claim to legitimate authority. He does not say that legitimacy is a necessary property of law. This view, which I call the claim view, constitutes my focal point in this paper. Many commentators have criticized this view. I discuss and dismiss three critiques of the claim view: the verification critique (the claim view is not empirically confirmed), the legalistic critique (law claims legal authority, not moral authority), and (...) the semantic critique (legal obligations are semantically distinct from moral obligations). I submit that Raz equates the meaning of legal duties with that of moral duties and yet denies that legal statements entail moral propositions. In other words, I distinguish the semantic identity thesis from the semantic entailment thesis. Instead of a semantic interpretation of the claim view, I defend a presuppositional ascription of a general claim to moral authority to authoritative duty‐imposing and normatively committed uses of legal language by official spokesmen. I show that law’s claim to authority does not prove the truth of the sources thesis, because conceptual confusion or insincerity can affect the epistemic reliability of the propositions embodied in the claim, and because blatant immorality can altogether cancel law’s pragmatically presupposed claim to moral authority. I also argue that the claim view can only warrant two qualified versions of exclusive legal positivism, one of which is almost tautological, the other self‐contradictory. Finally, I suggest that exclusive legal positivism cannot be defended on conceptual grounds. (shrink)

How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in . 'If A, then B' must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B. In this article we propose a formulation of , which unlike some of its predecessors, is compatible with our best theory of belief revision, the so-called AGM theory , chapters 1-5 for a survey). The new test, which, (...) we claim, encodes some of the crucial insights defended by F. P. Ramsey in , is used to study the conditionals epistemically validated by the AGM postulates. Our notion of validity is compared with the notion of negative validity used by Gärdenfors in . It is observed that the notions of PV and NV will in general differ and that when these differences arise it is the notion of PV that is preferable. Finally we compare our formulation of the Ramsey test with a previous formulation offered by Gärdenfors . We show that any attempt to interpret as delivering acceptance conditions for Ramsey's conditionals is doomed to failure. (shrink)

Las inquietudes cotidianas particulares -- Las inquietudes cotidianas fundamentales.

The anti- Humean proposal of constructing desire as belief about what would be good must be abandoned on pain of triviality. Our central result shows that if an agent's belief- desire state is represented by Jeffrey's expected value theory enriched with the Desire as Belief Thesis (DAB), then, provided that three pairwise inconsistent propositions receive non- zero probability, the agent must view with indifference any proposition whose probability is greater than zero. Unlike previous results against DAB our Opinionation or Indifference (...) Theorem is a purely synchronic one that depends in no way of the properties of Jeffrey conditionalization. (shrink)

How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in (Ramsey 1990).(RT) If A, then B must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B.

John Dewey’s philosophy has the notion of experience as backbone. The following paper regards experience as a method for doing philosophy, and a compromise grounding the entire philosophical project made by Dewey. Experience allows connecting cognition and affection in a natural way. Smart researching and arts creationappreciation are two modes to guide the progress of experience to a deeper level of meaning and from its own resources. The ideal way (the general description) of making part of the experience –which is (...) argued, smart and aesthetic– becomes stronger in the ideal of democracy. For this reason, Dewey’s philosophy of the experience works as a manner of interpreting democratic ideals. (shrink)

Disease represents a principal tentacle of natural selection and a staple theme of evolutionary medicine. However, it is through a small portal of entry and a very long lineage that disease as sickness entered behavioural spaces and human consciousness. This has a long evolutionary history. Anyone interested in the origins of medicine and psychiatry as social institution has to start with analysis of how mind and body were conceptualised and played out behaviourally following the pongid/hominin split and thereafter. The early (...) evolution of medicine provides a template for clarifying elemental characteristics of mind and minding. Sickness and healing in chimpanzees represents an early manifestation of (ethno) medicine, termed a behavioural tradition, which is found played out in routines of helping, caring, and healing as well as other social behaviours. Chimpanzees seem to know they are sick since they resort to self-medication when exhibiting signs and symptoms of disease. Also, they help those exhibiting physical and cognitive disability. Among hominins, awareness of consequences and implications of sickness and coping with them represented an important feature of human consciousness and a major factor in the origins of vaunted human abilities involving language, cognition, and culture as we know them. A philosophical examination of the early evolution of sickness and healing provides a window into an understanding of evolving human capacities such as self-awareness, awareness and implications of suffering, theory of mind, altruism, conceptual grasp of sickness and healing and morality. (shrink)

El presente artículo presenta los nuevos e importantes descubrimientos en la terraza litoral al pie del oasis de niebla, a partir de Noviembre de 2003, que junto a estudios anteriores conforman un cuadro general bastante completo de los patrones de asentamiento, modus vivendi, costumbres y actividades económicas de los antiguos pobladores costeros del norte de Chile, que reafirman la enorme importancia que adquirió el ecosistema de oasis de niebla costero en el género de vida, tipos de asentamiento y desplazamientos de (...) los cazadores-recolectores marinos del litoral norte. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of type-B materialism against Jackson’s knowledge argument (1982) inspired by the Kantian main opposition between concepts and sensible intuitions. Like all materialists of type B, I argue that on her release from her black-and-white room, Mary makes cognitive progress. However, contrary to the so-called phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS), I do not think that such progress can be accounted for in terms of the acquisition of new concepts. I also reject Tye’s recent account of (...) Mary’s cognitive progress as the acquisition of a “thing-knowledge.” What is crucial is not the Russellian opposition between knowing things and knowing truths but rather the Kantian opposition between conceptual and nonconceptual representations of the same thing (property). Mary’s phenomenal knowledge is here accounted for as the result of the cooperation of her newly acquired nonconceptual representation of the same phenomenal redness (the same thing) she had a conceptual representation before. As that new nonconceptual representation carries information about the same physical property she already represented but is now coded in analog rather than in digital form (Dretske, 1981), that nonconceptual representation can be accounted for in physical terms as Chalmers’s Master argument requires. Nevertheless, that representation can account for Mary’s cognitive progress since it carries information coded in analog form, something that the imprisoned she could never possess. (shrink)

I argue that my non-dual epistemic-phenomenalist view is the one that best harmonises my interpretation of the Fourth Paralogism with the widely shared reading of the Refutation of Idealism that I sketched and defended above. The bottom line of my view is a clear distinction between the metaphysical and epistemological sides of Kantian idealism. Again, according to my non-dual-epistemic-phenomenalism, the mundus sensibilis and mundus intelligibilis are epistemologically distinct ways of considering the metaphysically identical outside world. Appearances are nothing but the (...) way the things in themselves appear or exist inside our sensible minds as mere representations. In this sense, I reject both the two-world view, the two-aspect view, and Allais’s deflationary anti- phenomenalist reading. (shrink)

Sven-Ove Hansson and Erik Olsson studied in Hansson and Olsson, 103–119 1995) the logical properties of an operation of contraction first proposed by Isaac Levi in Levi. They provided a completeness result for the simplest version of contraction that they call Levi-contraction but left open the problem of characterizing axiomatically the more complex operation of value-based contraction or saturatable contraction. In this paper we propose an axiomatization for this operation and prove a completeness result for it. We argue that the (...) resulting operation is better behaved than various rival operations of contraction defined in recent years. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks (Int J Philos Stud 19(3):399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” (Erkenntnis/cognition) has, in both editions of the first Critique, a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception” (A320/B377). To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. If we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then (...) there is a gap in the argument since the categories are certainly not conditions for non-conceptual cognition (Kantian nonconceptualism). Still, I believe it is not this wide meaning but rather the narrow one that figures in any premise of the B-Deduction. Thus, in the reading that I am proposing, categories are not conditions for representing something (I call this the intentionality thesis), or even conditions for representing something objectively (I call this the objectivity thesis). Instead, they are conditions for the recognition that what we represent through the senses exists mind-independently. In the first step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of propositional thinking (transcendental apperception) that the nonconceptually represented object of the sensible intuition exists objectively. In contrast, in the second step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the apprehension (figurative synthesis) of what our human senses represent nonconceptually as existing objectively. (shrink)

The article focuses on representing different forms of non-adjunctive inference as sub-Kripkean systems of classical modal logic, where the inference from □A and □B to □A ∧ B fails. In particular we prove a completeness result showing that the modal system that Schotch and Jennings derive from a form of non-adjunctive inference in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is a classical system strictly stronger than EMN and weaker than K (following the notation for classical modalities presented in Chellas, 1980). The unified (...) semantical characterization in terms of neighborhoods permits comparisons between different forms of non-adjunctive inference. For example, we show that the non-adjunctive logic proposed in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is not adequate in general for representing the logic of high probability operators. An alternative interpretation of the forcing relation of Schotch and Jennings is derived from the proposed unified semantics and utilized in order to propose a more fine-grained measure of epistemic coherence than the one presented in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980). Finally we propose a syntactic translation of the purely implicative part of Jaśkowski's system D₂ into a classical system preserving all the theorems (and non-theorems) explicilty mentioned in (Jaśkowski, 1969). The translation method can be used in order to develop epistemic semantics for a larger class of non-adjunctive (discursive) logics than the ones historically investigated by Jaśkowski. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho é rever criticamente algumas interpretações contemporâneas da noção kantiana de intuição sensível. Defendo uma interpretação alternativa segundo a qual a intuição sensível em Kant deva ser entendida nos termos do que McDowell denomina sentido de re cuja principal característica é a dependênciado objeto. Nesse sentido, a função da intuição sensível é introduzir entidades no discurso para que essas possam ser conceituadas em juízos. Por essa razão,as intuições sensíveis devem ser vistas como o modo de se dar (...) dos objetos e seus atributos e relações que a eles se refere apenas na medida em que eles nos aparecem de forma dependente e relativa. (shrink)

Alchourrón y Bulygin sostienen que el derecho positivo, además de normas, contiene definiciones, que ponen de manifiesto un aparato conceptual a través del cual pensamos la realidad. A partir de esta afirmación argumentaré que hay un aspecto del derecho al que la teoría jurídica no ha prestado la atención que merece: la red de conceptos o categorías a través de la cual el derecho piensa, estructura, esquematiza o imagina la realidad. Sobre la base de una visión pluralista, sostengo que el (...) derecho moderno contiene una red conceptual singular, diferente a la construida por la ciencia y a la que está implícita en la vida cotidiana, aun cuando pueda receptar aspectos de una y otra. Dicho en el léxico de Quine, el derecho incluye criterios propios de objetivación e individuación, es decir, una ontología propia. En ese camino propongo algunas distinciones generales que pueden ser útiles para la descripción del derecho: definiciones expresas e implícitas por un lado; aparatos conceptuales derivados y aparatos conceptuales singulares del derecho, por el otro. La argumentación revela asimismo la relevancia y singularidad de categorías jurídicas muy básicas, como las de persona y cosa. (shrink)

¿Qué relación existe entre el cine y la filosofía, entre la narración y el pensamiento, entre la imagen y el concepto? ¿Qué tipo de conocimiento puede ofrecer el cine? ¿Qué quiere el cine de la filosofía? ¿Y la filosofía del cine? ¿Puede hacerse filosofía a través del cine o toda la filosofía que se hace es siempre una proyección de filosofía que no tiene nada que ver con el cine ni con las películas? ¿Puede el cine hacer algo más que (...) ilustrar ideas filosóficas previas? ¿Pueden los cineastas transmitir con sus películas ideas filosóficas originales? ¿Existe un pensamiento cinematográfico que se resiste a ser traducido al lenguaje conceptual? ¿Qué han dicho los filósofos sobre el cine? (shrink)

I argue for a new reading of Pyrrhonian beliefs inspired by representationalism (the content view) in recent philosophy of mind. I shall argue that there are two senses of acceptance or “acquiescence in something” (eudokein tini pragmati) rather than two senses of belief (doxa). For this reason, we can maintain along with Sextus that the Pyrrhonian skeptic behaves intentionally and can live his life in society adoxastôs without any proper beliefs whatsoever. However, the skeptical sense of acceptance is not the (...) mere avowal of a feeling or a mere report or register of the way things appear to me. I want to suggest the following reading. Acceptance without belief is an anti-predicative passive and involuntary acceptance of content by means of an indicator function (pathos or phainomenon) in virtue of the past regular connection between the representational content and the indicator function. The pathos (as a present state of mind) or the phainomenon “means” (that is, indicates) passively and involuntarily a content in virtue of its regular connection with this content through time. For example, the Pyrrhonian’s acceptance of the content of the sentence “there is fire” is based on the fact that he here and now perceives smoke and that pathos passively and involuntarily means (represents) the content that there is fire. There is no judgment involved at all: even when the skeptic suspends his judgment (epochê) about whether there is fire, his pathos makes him involuntarily accept that there is fire. That is what Sextus, following the Stoic tradition, calls “commemorative signs” (hupomnêstikon) in opposition to the so-called “indicative signs” (endeiktikon), namely the “internal assertion” of the content as a belief (as a propositional attitude). As I do not believe that any reasonable reading of the skeptical acceptance may be defended only by means of philological analysis and by the research of the huge doxography, my arguments deliberately mix historical evidence with reasons of a systematic nature. In this way, the defense of my alternative reading is abductive, namely as the inference to the best explanation. (shrink)

The idea that what we perceive are tropes (abstract particulars) is anything but new. In fact, it was one of the reasons why the ontology of tropes was postulated in the first place. Still, the claim that we perceive tropes is invariably and purely based on pre-philosophical intuitions or, indirectly, as a supporting argument for the advantages of the content view when compared to the relational view of experience. In this paper, I take the content view for granted and argue (...) in favor of what is herein referred to as the trope-content view of experience. My defense is a case of inference to the best explanation. The trope-content view can meet all reasonable desiderata on the experience and its content without assuming gaps or making the ad hoc assumption that there are different layers of content, or so shall I argue. (shrink)

Pain is a biological and subjective phenomenon. Clear understanding of its features is essential. Wierzbicka’s analysis accomplishes this. This comment discusses the relevance of her approach for the study of early evolution of medicine. The comment has six parts: (a) Wierzbicka’s theory and method; (b) its application to pain; (c) relevance of pain for the study of ethnomedicine, the cultural understanding of sickness and healing; (d) significance of natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) for understanding the evolution of human thought and behavior; (...) (e) relevance of NSM for studying biological and cultural evolution of early medicine; and (f) summary and conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS) and in favor of what Chalmers has called type-A materialism ([2006], [2010] p. 111). On her release, Mary makes no cognitive discovery at all, not even a thin, non-possibility-eliminating discovery, as Tye has recently claimed [2012]. When she is imprisoned, Mary already knows everything that is to be known about the phenomenal character of her experiences. What Mary acquires is a new non-cognitive and nonconceptual representation.

This paper aims to offer a new metaphysical view of both the representational content and the phenomenal or conscious character of visual experience inspired by Kaplan’s semantics of demonstratives. In Kaplan’s famous account, the character or meaning of a demonstrative type is understood as the function of a particular token of that type (vehicle of content) in the context of the demonstration of the singular content in the context in question. By way of analogy, I want to suggest that the (...) phenomenal character of experience can be best modeled as a function from tokens of experience in the context of experiential contact to their singular contents: that is, the instantiation of properties with which the subject is in experiential contact in those contexts. Since the meaning of demonstratives can also be described by its token-reflexive rule (the object demonstrated by this token demonstrative in this context of demonstration), we can also think of the phenomenal character as a token-reflexive property of representing whatever is normally causally responsible for this token experience in the context of experiential contact. This is what I call Reflexionism, inspired by Tye’s Kaplanianism (Tye 2009, 113-4, 2014). For example, phenomenal yellowness is the token-reflexive property of representing whatever is causally responsible for the relevant brain pattern in the context of experiential contact under normal conditions. (shrink)

A indiscutível riqueza da obra de Clarice Lispector já deu lugar a inúmeras interpretações.Neste ensaio, pretendemos acompanhar a leitura que Benedito Nunes realiza, pensando a literatura da escritora brasileira atravessada por um “centro mimético”. O conceito de mimese, distinguindo-se das concepções clássicas pensadas por Platão e Aristóteles, apontará, na leitura de Nunes, para a dramaticidade vivenciada por meio da linguagem na sua tentativa de falar sobre o mundo e o “eu” que o descreve. Para fins de clareza, analisaremos, com essa (...) categoria de “centro mimético”, três obras da autora que consideramos paradigmáticas: A cidade sitiada, A paixão segundo G.H. e A hora da estrela. (shrink)

It is shown that time may be appreciated in at least two senses: chronological and dynamical. Chronological time is the time of our naïve acquaintance as transient beings. At its most extensive scale, it corresponds to history encompassing both the abiotic and the biotic universe. Dynamical time, deriving from classical mechanics, is the time embraced by most of the laws of physics. It concerns itself only with present conditions since it is held that that the past may be reconstructed from (...) the present and the future predicted from the present, a position known as Laplacian determinism.Nonlinear dynamics has shown the fallacy of this supposition: The concrete values that may be assumed in the variables of the equations of motion constituting the laws of physics as a result of the spontaneous or intentional interaction of subject or measuring systems and of object or measured systems cannot be of infinite precision. Indeed, even if they could be, it is not at all clear that they would permit Laplacian determinism because of what is thought to be the ubiquity of K-flow dynamics in nature in which even infinite past information leading to the present cannot yield prediction of the future. In consequence, nonlinear dynamics, in rebellion against dynamical time, generates a primitive form of history distinguishing past, present, and future that may be termed nonlinear dynamical hysteresis.When nonlinear dynamics came to be complemented with semiotic modulation through the implement of symbol-mediated language as first instantiated through the communicating as opposed to the merely dynamically interacting molecular complexes of the cell, what can be termed semiotic hysteresis was born. The paper attempts to show that indefinitely evolving complexity, sustainability, justice, and meaning are indissolubly bound with chronological time in the sense of semiotic hysteresis : This semiotic hysteresis yields the indefinite evolutionary time of the living condition—including culture. (shrink)